‘Europe’s Last Dictator’ – the Hypocrisy of Ignoring Alexander Lukashenko

Jack Barton

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Police suppress protests after the rigged election in December 2010. AP Photo/Sergei Grits.

In a recent survey, only 1 in 50 people in Britain could locate Belarus on a map, perhaps this is why we ignore it.

With that statistic in mind it is small wonder that so few people are well-informed about the situation in Belarus.  Here are some of the highlights: President Alexander Lukashenko has been in power for 18 years; the last elections in December 2010 were accompanied by mass violence, election fraud and the arrest of hundreds of political activists and demonstrators, some of whom are still in jail; speaking out against the regime is a crime, at least two people are currently in jail for unfurling the pre-soviet flag.  The regime is propped up by a ‘secret’ police force which terrorises, tortures and arrests at its whim – having failed to change their name after 1991 they call themselves the KGB, presumably they wanted the Belarusian people to know who they were dealing with.

Condolezza Rice once called Belarus ‘the last true dictatorship in Europe’.  Lukashenko is a real old school autocrat – earlier this year he responded to a similar accusation by the German foreign minister by saying that it was ‘better to be a dictator than be gay’.

This spat was part of a recent trend of anti-Lukashenko rhetoric within Europe.  Earlier this year the EU withdrew its ambassadors from Belarus on the grounds of human rights abuses, including the torture and illegal detention of prisoners of conscience.  After much posturing, Lukashenko released two political prisoners – 2010 Presidential favourite Andrei Sannikov (who had been in prison ever since despite signing a plea for release after being tortured and receiving threats to the lives of his children) and his campaign manager Dmitry Bandarenka.  EU ambassadors are in the process of returning.

It is unclear what spurred this act of protest by the EU – certainly awareness about human rights abuses in Belarus has been rising over the past year with the release of the film Europe’s Last Dictator, which just won Best Documentary at the London Independent Film Festival, and the work of the UK-based Free Belarus Now campaign set us by Sannikov’s sister Irina Bogdonova.  This type of work however, is currently left entirely on the shoulders of individuals such as Bogdonova and director Matthew Charles.  The law is on their side, but they have no defence from the Belarusian authorities.  Though Free Belarus Now focuses mainly on the release of political prisoners, it currently has a pending law suit waiting in the hands of law firms all over the world which means that no senior member of Lukashenko’s government can visit certain counties without being charged with being complicit in illegal detention and torture.  This is backed-up by an EU travel ban – the head of the KGB recently had to travel to Rome in secret to avoid this.  At the same time however, watching Europe’s Last Dictator in Belarus will get you arrested while the ‘Free Belarus Now’ website and their staff emails get hacked by the KGB every few days.

On 24^th May Lukashenko made a statement which summarises diplomatic relations with Belarus: ‘I hear more and more statements that European diplomats wait for an amnesty, again raising the question of political prisoners ... We expect specific steps from the West and from the European Union.  The ball is in their court.’  Lukashenko can blackmail the EU by holding political prisoners hostage – he knows he can because he has been doing it since his first rigged election, and because it works.  The EU has placed a number of sanctions on the Belarusian government but the withdrawal of its ambassadors was the strongest step it had taken in a long time, the fact that they started returning as soon as Sannikov and Bandarenka were released showed that there was no subtle underlying politics to this trade-off and it showed that they have given up trying to make other sanctions hurt.

Undermining Lukashenko is not a lost cause.  Even if publicly denouncing him counts as little more than a symbolic gesture, it would be one in tune with all of the principles Western leaders are desperate to stand by yet the fail to do so.  The failure of Western leaders must in part be due to lack of awareness in the public.  When the prisoners were released it was a huge story for Eastern European news outlets while in Britain only The Independent covered it – despite the urging of Free Belarus Now to many others.  Angela Merkel rebuked Lukashenko over the gay jibe but that is the most there has been for some time.  Russia alone has made its stance perfectly clear by announcing tighter border checks to stop the escape of political refugees and with Putin planning to make the first state visit of his new term to Minsk.

European leaders do not support Lukashenko, unlike mad dictators elsewhere in the world there is not enough distance to be completely disassociated with him, so they ignore him.  It is clear to anyone that he is a deluded tyrant of the type which (unfortunately for Sacha Baron Cohen) are too absurd to make up.  But if you read the news coming out of Belarus every day this neutrality is shameful.  The Belarusian people have never escaped Soviet-style dictatorship yet dictatorship in Europe is ignored while those of the Middle East occupy our headlines and our politicians’ speeches.  European leaders do not want another problem country to deal with but they are in a position to give the EU sanctions some teeth, as long as they preach a devotion to freedom and democracy they are surely under an obligation to do so.

Putin’s G8 Snub: Much Ado About Nothing

Joanna Christou

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Newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin meeting with heads of the CSTO and other regional leaders in early May. The Moscow Times.    

Two weeks ago, US President Barack Obama hosted the G8 summit at Camp David consisting of the heads of state of the world’s eight largest economies. However, this time there was a notable absentee, newly re-elected Russian President Vladimir Putin who opted not to attend, citing the need to form his government and appoint his cabinet. 

Much has been said about this decision with speculation that this was a rather blatant signal that US-Russia relations are at a low ebb. In recent months, Russian displeasure has been evident particularly following the state department’s public criticism of the Kremlin’s democratic standards during the widespread anti-government protests in the Russian capital. Putin went as far as accusing secretary of state Hillary Clinton of inciting the protests, a rather bold claim but one that does show the extent of Russian feelings on what they have traditionally viewed as foreign meddling in their domestic affairs. 

That Putin’s decision not to attend the G8 was some form of a ‘snub’ is in many ways also re-affirmed when considering the Russian president’s usual desire to be in the public eye and to project an image of Russia as a great power. Missing an opportunity to attend a meeting as high profile as the G8 does in fact seem unusual, especially considering the two main topics of the agenda were the Eurozone’s financial crisis and international security particularly concerning Syria and Afghanistan, both of which have the potential to cause adverse consequences for Russia with the former possibly affecting the price of oil and the latter de-stabilising security in the already volatile Russian neighbourhood. 

Obviously, all this draws a rather grim picture of US-Russian relations. It is a well known fact that despite attempts to reset the relationship since Barack Obama’s accession to the White House, things have not gone particularly smoothly with the two powers clashing on a number of topics, including the planned US missile shield for Eastern Europe and their opinions on how to deal with the situation in Syria. However, it is also important not to read too much into Putin’s decision not to attend. The publicity surrounding this decision almost completely overshadowed the fact the Dmitry Medvedev, the now former Russian president and newly appointed Prime Minister did in fact attend. So while the situation may suggest a clash of personalities between Putin and Obama (and some of his subordinates such as Secretary Clinton) it does not suggest a widespread breakdown of relations. While some kind of reconciliation may be required – it has been four years since Putin was a head of state – it does not represent a major turning point in the relationship.

Newly appointed Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in attendance at the G8 meeting at Camp David. The Telegraph.

It is also worth considering the excuse given for not attending the summit. While as mentioned already Putin has always relished the opportunity to be seen on the big stage, it is worth noting that he has also always sought to maintain a strong position at home and within Russia’s immediate neighbourhood. It does seem fair to suggest that leaving Russian soil for an overseas summit which in many respects simply represents an opportunity for ‘group cuddling’ may not have been a wise move. Putin was only re-elected two months ago and this came in a time of unprecedented protests against him and the political establishment in general. Hence, his decision to stay may have been truly based on the domestic situation. 

Furthermore, in the run up to his re-election he did stress his desire for Russia to re-focus its energies on relations with its neighbourhood. Putin already met with the heads of the of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and non-members including the Ukraine and Moldova in early May, confirming he prioritises this region. Likewise, he has sought to capitalise on some of his neighbours’ weaknesses early on in order to strengthen the Russian position. For example, Ukraine and its president Victor Yanukovich have faced mounting criticism from the EU over the imprisonment of former president Yulia Tymoshenko and the voices of dissent are getting louder with senior EU figures, including the President of the EU commission Jose Manuel Barroso, threatening to boycott the Ukraine legs of the upcoming European Football Championships to be held jointly with Poland. This seems to have provided an opportunity for Putin to put pressure on his already besieged Ukrainian counterpart to sign a free trade agreement which other former Soviet states have already ratified.

So where does all this leave us in regards to what Putin’s decision not to attend the G8 says about the current state of play between Russia and the US? Well, it seems fair to suggest very little has changed. Even before this so-called ‘snub’ there was some obvious discord in the relationship occasionally manifesting itself when the two disagreed on major policy issues. However, when it has seemed necessary Obama and his Russian counterpart (previously Medvedev and now Putin) have met or will meet. In fact, it seems that the US administration went out of its way to stress it was neither ‘surprised’ nor ‘disappointed’ and pointed that Obama and Putin will in fact be meeting in the coming month (at the G20 in Mexico). 

So nothing it seems has changed for the worse in the relationship between the US and Russia, however it is also fair to suggest that nothing has changed for the better. And this is now the challenge for both parties to address. With Putin now in the picture for at least another six years (having amended the constitution to allow for six year terms) the US now faces the challenge of finding ways to constructively deal with the Russian regime on a number of serious issues including global security and economic stability which could have dire affects for both should they be mishandled. 

Russia and the scramble for the Arctic

Adam Lenton

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Russian offshore oil rig. Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible to oil exploration. Cisoilgas.com. 

Climate change may be set to adversely affect hundreds of millions of people, but there are some who see it as a potential boon in the northernmost extremity of the planet. Commercial shipping sees the melting ice as a way to save travel time- up to 25%- between Rotterdam and Korea, avoiding the lengthy route through the Suez Canal and passing instead above Russia- known as the Northeastern Passage. It has only been in recent years that ships have been able to do this, given the receding of Arctic ice. It has also relied upon Russian bureaucracy’s willingness to facilitate transport, by allowing ships in its Arctic ports and by providing ice-breakers.

Notwithstanding this, there is a treasure trove of untapped resources hidden beneath the Arctic Ocean waiting to be claimed. According to the United States Geological Survey, around a quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves lay there. Determining who actually owns the ground to be explored is a fastidious task. The UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS) allows a ten-year period for nations to stake territorial claims, based on the territorial limits of a continental shelf. Russia is set to claim up to 380,000 square miles of the internationally owned Arctic in the next year, arguing that the Lomosonov ridge is an extension of Siberia. Whatever the Commission decides- and it is reasonable to assume that Russia has a legitimate claim to the lion’s share of territory given it’s geographical dominance in the region vis-à-vis smaller nations such as Norway- the biggest problem is that Russia’s most powerful rival in the region, the US, hasn’t yet ratified UNCLOS.

Perhaps this US intransigence can explain Russia’s brash move in 2007, sending a scientific vessel under the Arctic Ocean and planting the Russian flag underneath the North Pole. This symbolic act failed to attract the kind of attention that such a gesture sought. Policymakers may have tactically downplayed this, or simply been preoccupied with more pressing concerns of the recent financial crises- but they cannot ignore this sensitive region for much longer. A renewed confidence from President-elect Vladimir Putin may well translate into the kinds of geopolitical recalcitrance that has long irritated the West.  

Concern may be behind Putin’s confidence. Promises to increase social spending by $170 billion may make exploration in the Arctic paramount in Russia’s future foreign policy. Unlike areas such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Kremlin sees the Arctic as a region which hasn’t already succumbed to NATO’s influence. Profit and pride will combine to ensure that Russia will defiantly defend its interests there. Putin already made clear that the Russian Navy needed to be ‘capable of service in the Arctic Ocean’. For policymakers, this should be of concern, especially given Putin’s lack of consistency with foreign businesses. BP may be overjoyed at a joint venture with Rosneft in the region, but it should also remember that back in 2007 Gazprom bought up its gas fields in Siberia, paying such a low price that it was considered to be ‘bordering on nationalisation’. A pressurised Putin may find such an option to be a good way of increasing state revenues.

British businesses may find their situation becomes more precarious as more wealth is found in the region. Press TV.

The UK doesn’t need a worsening of UK-Russia relations. At best they have been tense, and this certainly wouldn’t be ameliorated if British businesses like BP were to be unsure of their long-term presence in Russia. Yet unless clear national boundaries are decided in the Arctic, this uncertainty cannot be expected to diminish. Britain may not be an Arctic nation, but it still has an interest to reduce tension amongst them. Trying to persuade the US to ratify UNCLOS, and therefore establishing clear rules of what territory can be claimed, would be a good starting point for future negotiations. The latency of the Arctic as a geopolitical hotspot is quite clear, and Russia has already made some clear indications of its interest in the region. An aggressive approach by the United States would provide the sort of threat Putin’s rhetoric thrives on and would be counterproductive for all nations involved. The only certainty for policymakers is that since Putin isn’t leaving anytime soon, the West will need to tread carefully over the ever-thinning ice.

Putin’s Eurasian Union: A Bold but Unsustainable Vision

Joanna Christou

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Outgoing Russian President Dimitri Medvedev at the meeting with other Eurasian leaders to discuss the proposed Eurasian Union. Radio Free Europe

Vladimir Putin’s return to the helm in Russia is hardly surprising, and with it comes the rhetoric and foreign policy of a leader who has always sought to bolster his country’s status as a great power. Part and parcel of this package are the surrounding regions, which have always faced the often overbearing influence of their largest neighbour. In Soviet times this influence was expanded, formalised and centralised with the creation of the 15 republics encompassing territories from Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Baltics. 

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, the Russian desire to remain involved in its region has manifested itself through the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which has largely been a symbolic structure, often dubbed as the mechanism to bring about a civilised divorce. However, Russian desire to take a proactive lead in bringing greater co-operation and integration in the region remains and the vision is bold. In October of 2011, when announcing his run for the presidency Putin also proclaimed his desire to base his foreign policy largely on the creation of a Eurasian Union which would bring ‘a stronger integration on a new political and economic basis and a new system of values is an imperative of our era’. Practical steps towards this have seemingly begun. Just last week, Russia’s outgoing president Dmitry Medvedev hosted a meeting including the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine on the subject, with the aim of establishing the Union by 2015. Yet, despite the rhetoric and subsequent meetings, the vision would arguably be very difficult to achieve for a number of reasons.

Firstly, despite Putin’s proclamations that the Union would not resemble its Soviet predecessor, it is difficult to imagine anything too far off from it. As the biggest country and strongest economy in the region Russia would by default take the leading role. And while Putin may be genuine in his desire to avoid the mistakes of the past it seems unlikely that he will be able to convince his closest neighbours otherwise. Ukraine for example has consistently rejected Russian forays towards greater integration, rather choosing to periodically but openly to align itself with the EU and NATO and to join the WTO. The Georgian reaction to the Union was particularly hostile, with president Mikhail Saakashvili rejecting the idea as little more than an attempt to reconstitute the Soviet Union and the republics’ subordination within it. So while Russian desire is definitely present, the reluctance of the other states will make turning this into a reality very difficult.

Vladimir Putin outlined his vision for a Eurasian Union in late 2011, coinciding with his announcement to re-run for the Russian presidency. The Telegraph

This reluctance is further influenced by the internal politics of each state and how these motivate their actions. For Putin, the Union would most likely be a good thing. In the face of the recent discontent and delegitimisation at home, what better than to attempt at diverting attention to region-wide initiatives. Even economically it is difficult to argue against such a scheme which could regulate trade and make the bloc more competitive. 

However, the economics alone seem unlikely to sway the political considerations of the other states. If the Union would help Putin politically at home, it would be perceived to do the exact opposite for other participant states. This is because authoritarianism and corruption are not limited to Russia but are a widespread issue in the post-Soviet space. Because of this, leaders in other states would most likely fear an erosion of their power should integration progress. 

Such a pre-occupation with maintaining the internal status quo has already hampered processes of integration at a smaller level. Numerous organisations have been formed since the 1990s. Examples include the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), GUAM, the Community of Democratic Choice and the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation. The membership of each is varied but the one thing they all have in common is their confinement to paper with very little to show for in terms of concrete results. The reason for this failure is largely linked to the desire of most leaders to shield themselves from any influences which may seek to delegitimise or question their rule. So for example, the Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation in Central Asia has touted ‘The Shanghai Spirit’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus’ as its base values. The former represents mutual trust and co-operation but the latter refers to economic growth and development without political interference. This translates into an organisation which effectively promotes the security of the authoritarian regimes in the region from outside interference and bolsters their individual security. Essentially, if the CIS provided a civilised divorce, regional organisations like the SCO represent a marriage of convenience. It is a guarantee of such non-interference which seems unlikely to continue should a Eurasian Union, led by Russia and Putin, come to being. The Kremlin’s support for Viktor Yanukovic during the 2004 Ukrainian elections for example was very public, with Putin visiting Kiev twice and offering his congratulations to him before the results were public (he actually lost the election). Such precedents are likely to make other states fearful of entering any formal and widespread integration project. 

This all highlights another obstacle to integration, Russia’s problematic stance of undermining its neighbours in order to achieve its own goals. For example, even despite the pro-Kremlin Yanukovich’s eventual accession to power in 2010, Russia has struggled to maintain good relations with Ukraine. A major issue, highlighted by a government figure from Ukraine has been the Kremlin’s inability to view the country as an equal partner despite a number of Ukrainian concessions including dropping their pursuit to join NATO. Ultimately, it is this attitude which taints Russian interactions with all its neighbours and which will most likely seal the fate of any plan to promote integration on a wide level. 

So while Putin’s plans may be grand and his vision is undoubtedly bold, its materialisation seems highly unlikely as Russia will always view itself as the regional leader who knows best. This attitude, and its historical resonance through the Soviet Union’s history, will always clash with the post-Soviet states’ desire to be treated as independent equals, and to uphold their own, often authoritarian, regimes. 

Britain’s Central Asian Predicament

Adam Lenton

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Leaders of Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Afganistan in Dushanbe. Central Asia Online (in Russian).

In Tajikistan, festivities are already under way for Norouz- Iranian New Year. Although William Hague sent his best wishes on an online video, it’s likely that this will be overshadowed by Mahmoud Ahmadinijad’s personal visit this Saturday.

This is sure to strengthen what are already strong relations between Iran and Tajikistan. Tajikistan, along with several other states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, are termed as ‘Greater Iran’ due to their common historical and cultural ties. Notwithstanding this, all of the contemporary states of ‘Greater Iran’ form part of the Economic Cooperation Organisation, a trade organisation comprising of some 400 million people which aims to create a single-market union much like the EU. Tehran- seat of the ECO’s headquarters- may be increasingly isolated in the West, but this certainly isn’t the case in Central Asia.

It’s not hard to see why. Capitalising on the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Iran made its interest in the region clear. It was one of the first countries to recognise the independence of the 5 ex-Soviet states that comprise Central Asia, and was the first state to establish an embassy in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe.

Leaders of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan at the Eurasian economic summit.  RIA Novosti.

Iran isn’t the only influence in the region. The USSR may be dead, but Russia’s influence is still very much alive. Incidentally the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were also the Presidents of the previous Soviet Republics. Just like in the Soviet era, Russian is the regional lingua franca. President-elect Vladimir Putin has his own visions for a Eurasian Union to be established by 2015. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation- a security organisation- already exists and counts Russia, China and 4 of the 5 Central Asian Republics amongst its membership (Turkmenistan, the only state not a member, is still a ‘guest’).

It’s worth wondering why the West is bothering. It seems axiomatic that the likes of Russia, Iran and China are better placed to vie for influence, rather than countries like Britain, which have few ties to the region. If indeed influence is a zero-sum affair, it’s hard to imagine any established regional influence loosening its grip over an increasingly important geopolitical region. This is already self-evident. The US, which maintains two bases in Central Asia, is acutely aware of its precariousness in the region, and consequently refrains from anything too recalcitrant- it hasn’t swayed from its stance that its forces will be withdrawn once Afghanistan is ‘stabilised.’ Interest in the region extends beyond military logistics. Afghanistan shares borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which makes their cooperation and ensuing stability priorities for policymakers in London and Washington.

However, Britain faces an enormous stumbling block. Policy was turned upside-down when several regimes were overthrown last year during the Arab Spring. It, too, had been a region where stability was hitherto the main concern of policymakers. The West’s short-sightedness had created a democratic backwater which, once ignited, exploded. The parallels are astonishing. The tenure of the deposed Arab leaders was not measured in years, but decades. All had led authoritarian regimes with considerable presidential power, whilst justifying this with a vociferous anti-extremism rhetoric.

Tajikistan, for example, is on the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) placed it within a list of the world’s 16 worst abusers of religious freedom, and Tajik authorities have faced criticism for unjust convictions of so-called terrorists. More recently, Tajikistan temporarily blocked access to Facebook at the beginning of March. Tajikistan isn’t alone. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are all unfavourably mentioned by USCRIF.

It’s not in Britain’s interest to condone this. Another regional upheaval would be incredibly destabilising, yet the lessons of the Arab Spring indicate that Britain can’t ignore these states in the naïve hope that conditions will remain effervescent until it’s convenient to demand change. Whilst unexpected and turbulent upheaval certainly isn’t something that would be good for Britain, it cannot realistically make demands in a region where parliamentary democracy is seen as a very foreign concept, for it is likely to further weaken its influence there. It cannot feasibly condemn the persecution of alleged terrorists, for Russia is a strong advocate of a hard-line approach as has been seen in Chechnya. Nor can Britain express concerns over the blocking of social media sites, as China is well-known for its stance regarding Facebook.

Britain needs to be careful not to push Central Asian states closer to Tehran by dictating change in the region. Radio Netherlands Worldwide.

Iran complicates things further. It has already been seen by some in the Middle East as an example of conservative Islamic government to follow. Given its ties to Central Asia- which are much stronger- political upheaval in the region could prove catastrophic if it resulted in the establishment of theocratic anti-Western governments based on the Iranian model. Britain cannot therefore continue to pressure Iran unless it secures more concrete support from China and Russia.

Russia and China are not leviathans; eventually they, too, will lose their patience with Iran if it continues to isolate itself on the world stage, which would provide a relief for policymakers- for whom Iran is the immediate worry. A political relaxation in the region and a weaker Iran would allow politicians to voice stronger concerns over Central Asia without fear that it would push leaders towards Tehran. Stronger cooperation with countries like Britain may then appear more favourable to the leaders of the region as a way to remind Russia and China that influence is not a given.

Britain and the West seem to acknowledge their limited ability to voice concerns in the region. However, it is in their interest to ensure that the failures of the Arab world are not repeated in another strategically important place.